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ABSTRACT
Tax expenditures are well known in all countries. However, they are of low repute, 
not only because politicians often use them to disguise relief for interest groups in 
the tax code, but also because they are seen as less targeted and less efficient than 
direct expenditure. In this article, two hitherto neglected aspects of tax expendi-
tures are discussed. The first of these is tax shifting and what it implies in terms 
of outcomes. The second and more important is the problem caused by tax expen-
ditures in the area of intergovernmental relations, which arises from the effects of 
tax expenditures in the intergovernmental system. In the article, these effects are 
highlighted and described in detail: (1) vertical effects of tax expenditures, reflect-
ing the impact of tax expenditures on budgets at different levels; (2) horizontal ex-
ternalities, which characterize the effects of tax expenditures on budgets at the same 
level; and (3) the negative impact of tax expenditures on equalization processes. All 
of these effects are systematized in various ways; together, they present a coherent 
approach for later empirical country studies
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HIGHLIGHTS
1. The effects of tax shifting on tax expenditure are described according to a sys-
tematic approach. The outcome of shifting consists in changes in the pattern of the 
intended beneficiaries
2. Criteria are developed for judging the various vertical effects of tax expen-
ditures in the system of intergovernmental relations. A three-dimensional tax 
expenditure classification schema was developed in order to systematize these 
effects
3. Horizontal externalities from tax expenditure within intergovernmental relations 
are demonstrated in a comprehensive way
4. It is demonstrated that tax expenditures may disturb the intended equalization 
pattern. For instance, tax expenditures for personal equalization and grants for 
regional equalization may lead to sizable discrepancies between the outcomes of 
these two channels
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Налоговые расходы как инструмент экономической политики имеют немало 
недостатков, в связи с чем зачастую считаются менее эффективными, чем пря-
мые расходы бюджета любого уровня. Большинство этих недостатков весьма 
подробно описаны в существующей экономической литературе. Однако дис-
куссия, развернутая вокруг них, не затрагивает в настоящий момент по край-
ней мере два весьма важных аспекта этой проблемы, которым и посвящена 
представленная статья. Во-первых, это проблема «переложения» налоговых 
расходов или, иными словами, присвоения выгод от их существования лица-
ми, на которых они не были ориентированы. Во-вторых, и что более важно, это 
проблемы межбюджетных отношений, порождаемые наличием у налоговых 
расходов особого рода эффектов, проявляющихся в условиях многоуровневой 
системы государственного устройства. В отношении последних в статье вы-
делены и подробно описаны (1) вертикальные эффекты налоговых расходов, 
отражающие влияние налоговых расходов на бюджеты разных уровней; (2) го-
ризонтальные экстерналии, характеризующие эффекты налоговых расходов 
на бюджеты внутри одного уровня бюджетной системы; а также (3) негативное 
влияние налоговых расходов на процессы межбюджетного выравнивания. На-
званные эффекты систематизированы в целях формирования целостного под-
хода к дальнейшим эмпирическим исследованиям влияния налоговых расхо-
дов на межбюджетные отношения
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
Налоговые расходы, налоговая льгота, налоговое бремя, экстерналии, межбюд-
жетные отношения, выравнивание, горизонтальное равенство, налоговая конку-
ренция, экспорт налогового бремени, внешние эффекты, конкуренция расходов, 
межбюджетные трансферы, финансовая помощь, нефинансируемый мандат
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. В систематизированном виде описаны эффекты, возникающие в результате 
«переложения» налоговых расходов (присвоения выгод от их существования 
лицами, для которых они напрямую не предназначались). В результате сделан 
вывод о том, что в результате переложения структура бенефициаров налоговых 
расходов может существенно отличаться от задуманной законодателем
2. В целях оценки и систематизации вертикальных эффектов выработаны необ-
ходимые критерии, а также проведена трехмерная классификация налоговых 
расходов в межбюджетных отношениях
3. Описаны горизонтальные эффекты налоговых расходов в межбюджетных от-
ношениях, возникающие в результате влияния налоговых расходов одной тер-
ритории на жителей близлежащий территорий
4. Обосновано, что в ряде случаев налоговые расходы могут помешать процес-
сам межбюджетного выравнивания. В частности, это возможно в случае, если 
налоговые расходы перераспределительного характера и дотации на выравни-
вание бюджетной обеспеченности распределяются по территории страны в со-
ответствии с противоречащими друг другу критериями
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1. Introduction
Tax expenditure, which takes place in 
every country, is an instrument by which 
governments choose to relieve enterpris-
es and individuals of some tax burden 
by means of a tax exemption instead of 
extending direct payments to them. As 
compared to the use of direct expenditure, 
the tax expenditure is often questioned in 
terms of its effectiveness. Tax expenditure 
becomes particularly problematic when 
it occurs in a federal system with several 
layers of government. In this context, the 
aim of this article is to identify undesir-
able effects that emerge if tax expenditure 
is used in federal systems. Before this can 
be done in any larger study on a country1, 
some preliminary considerations concern-
ing tax expenditure in general — and in 
intergovernmental relations in particu-
lar — are required.
There is an extensive literature on tax 
expenditure, both on its specifics and on 
the difficulties of assessing it empirically. 
Assessments were made early in the USA, 
accompanied by early theoretical work on 
tax expenditure in general. Later assess-
ments were made in Canada [2], Australia 
[3] and other countries, including Ger-
many, where it also has existed officially 
for many years [4] and is the subject of 
regular empirical studies [5; 6]. While not 
taken up in detail here, this thorny issue 
of assessment is important for any country 
study. Rather, this paper will take a sys-
tematic theoretical approach to the study 
of tax expenditure.
In the general literature on tax expen-
diture, two aspects seem to have not yet 
been analyzed in detail: 
1. What happens to tax expenditure in 
the process, to which any tax or tax change 
is subject, from announcement affects to 
tax shifting etc.? Knowledge of these ef-
fects is an important aspect in the study of 
intergovernmental relations.
2. The relation of tax expenditure to 
the specifics of a federal system appears to 
have not been the subject of any serious 
study. 
1 This is the case in the ongoing work by 
S. Bykov on tax expenditure in the Russian Federa-
tion [1].
Consequently, the first part dwells 
somewhat longer on tax effects, while the 
second part elaborates the basic issues that 
arise when tax expenditure occurs within 
a federal system. The federal system is 
analyzed as a three-layer system, com-
prising the federal government, a middle 
level (states, oblasts, lander etc., hereafter 
referred to as state level), and a local level. 
The local level is not further divided into 
a district level (rayon, Landkreis etc.) and 
its constituent local governments.
2. Why is tax expenditure  
a subject of concern? 
2.1. What is a tax expenditure? 
The most effective means of specifying 
what is meant by tax expenditure is to com-
pare it to direct expenditures carried out to 
achieve the same aim. Direct expenditure 
provides the recipients — whether enter-
prises or individuals — with an amount 
of money. Tax expenditure tries to do the 
same, but in an indirect way, with the re-
cipients being permitted to pay lower taxes 
than would otherwise have been the case. 
This can occur, for example, in the income 
tax system by either reducing the tax rate 
on the intended activity or by leaving that 
activity out of the tax base. Another ex-
ample is VAT. In this case, one can exempt 
those goods from taxation that are assumed 
to be primarily purchased by low-income 
citizens. Alternatively, the tax rate can be 
reduced for these classes of goods, as is 
the case in countries like Germany, where 
there exist two VAT rates of 7 % and 19 %. 
From this comparison it is obvious that the 
term tax expenditure is somehow mislead-
ing, since it is not an actual expenditure, 
but is rather designed to achieve the same 
effect as the equivalent amount of direct 
expenditure. A term like tax subsidy might 
be better; however, the term tax expendi-
ture is applied here because it is the most 
widely used term, including in Russia.
A more precise definition of tax ex-
penditure is needed when data are to be 
analyzed. To take the example of VAT, 
what exactly is meant by “goods for dai-
ly use” etc., which then is subject to the 
lower rate? The same is true for business 
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taxation. There is something like a normal 
tax base for the tax on profits, so whatever 
differentiation occurs between elements 
of the calculated profit is not to be consi-
dered as a tax expenditure [7–10, etc.]. 
In empirical terms, direct expenditure 
and tax expenditure show up in very dif-
ferent parts of budget policies and statis-
tics. When a direct expenditure is decided 
upon politically, it is determined during 
the budgetary process and becomes part of 
the budget. Consequently, its size can be 
obtained by looking into budget figures. 
The amount of tax expenditures, on the 
other hand, cannot be ascertained directly 
in any regular document. Rather, they are 
shown in the figures on tax revenue to the 
extent that that amount is lowered. There 
is no annual automatic registration of these 
figures, as occurs with direct expenditures. 
Therefore, in order to find out about tax 
expenditures, sophisticated work is nec-
essary. One approach would be to assess 
the amount for certain individual cases, 
be they enterprises or private households, 
and then multiply by the respective group. 
In general, such indirect method is neces-
sary in order to study the amount of tax 
expenditure in a country.
2.2. What happens to tax expenditure  
through shifting?
The result of the assessment is a vol-
ume of statistics on tax expenditures in a 
particular country. The interpretation of 
these figures then takes place according to 
various objectives — in this case, their role 
in a multi-layer, federal system. At this 
point it is necessary to analyze what hap-
pens to them in reality — again, in com-
parison with direct expenditure. In order 
to analyze this theoretically and empiri-
cally, one has to draw on completely dif-
ferent sections of public finance theory. In 
the case of direct expenditure, the effects 
are relatively clear. The recipient receives 
directly a certain amount of money and 
is most probably able to use it fully. Of 
course, there exists in principle the counter-
part shifting activity, which takes the form 
of “expenditure snatching” [11, p. 328] in 
which the recipient is deprived of certain 
advantages. When a considerable rise in 
pensions occurred in Germany, it could 
be observed that the price of typical goods 
bought by pensioners rose more in retail 
shops in locations near where pensioners 
typically lived than elsewhere, thus reduc-
ing the advantage of the higher pension. 
However, in general one can assume that 
the advantage of the direct expenditure 
stays with the recipient.
That is different for tax expendi-
tures. They are part of a tax and share, 
so to speak, the fate of that tax on its 
way through shifting to “the final resting 
place” [12, p. 216]. Since there already ex-
ists a large literature on these taxation ef-
fects, tax expenditure has to somehow be 
inserted into that analysis. Some aspects 
of this, which have been pointed out by 
Burton [8, p. 116–117], are systematically 
inserted here. The system referred to in 
Figure 1 is used in a German public fi-
nance textbook in which a whole chapter 
is dedicated to tax effects [13, p. 123].
 
 
 
 
 
Tax impact
Tax adjustment = change of behavior
Before tax payment:
Adjustment by tax evasion 
(Announcement effect)
a) Factual avoidance = 
change in tax base
b) Temporal avoidance 
Delay purchase etc.
c) Regional avoidance 
Change place of action 
After tax payment:
Adjustment by shifting
(Tax shifting in the 
narrower sense)
a) Forward shifting e.g. 
through price rise
b) Backward shifting e.g. 
lowering price of 
purchases
After all effects the 
burden is borne:
Adjustment to the tax 
burden
a) Catching up 
through more work or 
rationalization
b) Accepting the tax 
burden
Figure 1. Types of adjustment to a tax change (tax shifting in the wider sense)
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The whole process starts with a tax 
impact, mostly triggered by a change in 
the tax code. Enterprises and individuals 
then try to adjust to this by some change 
in their behavior. The system is built up 
as a sequence, starting from the announce-
ment of a tax (1). At that stage, the tax can 
be avoided in several ways. To the degree 
that it cannot be avoided, a tax payment 
occurs. Then the tax can be shifted to 
somebody else (2). If that does not work, 
the resulting tax burden can lead to more 
efforts to catch up (3). And if that does 
not help, the tax burden has finally to be 
borne. It should be noted that the three 
“stages” in Figure 1 are shown as stages. 
However, in reality, they may — and of-
ten will — occur simultaneously. 
1. Starting with the first stage: to the 
degree that the tax with the exemption 
is avoided (left part of Figure 1), the ad-
vantage does not reach the recipient. If 
the taxpayer avoids an income tax by not 
declaring his income, the intended special 
advantage does not reach him. The same is 
true for a subsidy to enterprises by means 
of a tax exemption if tax avoidance occurs 
in the field of enterprise taxation. Howev-
er, if the avoidance took place illegally, the 
tax-payer-to-be has at the same time lost 
his legal tax expenditure in that process. It 
should be noted in addition that all forms 
of tax expenditure reach only those people 
who pay taxes. 
2. A major issue is the possible shift-
ing of the tax burden once the tax has been 
paid or is reasonably expected to be paid. 
Irrespective of whether the tax has been 
shifted forward by raising the price of 
sold products or backward by decreasing 
the price of the purchased goods, there is a 
question as to what tax expenditure means 
in this situation. Looking at forward shift-
ing, if a sizable tax expenditure has been 
granted there is probably less need to shift 
or only the need for the remaining tax 
payment to be shifted. The same is true 
for backward shifting. To put it in general 
terms, the higher the tax exemption, the 
lower the tax load which is considered for 
shifting. This is particularly important in 
market forms where shifting is difficult, 
for instance because of inelastic supply. 
3. The question of adjustment to the 
tax burden (right part of Figure 1) is simi-
lar. Only the final tax burden, which con-
sists of the full tax minus the tax expen-
diture, is a tax burden and could lead to 
efforts to catch up one way or the other.
Summing up over all stages of tax 
adjustments, the result is apparent: the 
tax expenditure lowers the tax load and 
thus reduces the need for any of the three 
types of tax adjustment. However, com-
pared to direct expenditure, the effects 
additionally further blurred. Not only 
are tax expenditures difficult to calculate 
as foregone revenue but, additionally, it 
remains unclear which recipient receives 
how much of the intended amount. This 
further reduces the effect of targeting a 
tax expenditure, which is anyway lower 
than for direct expenditure. If a targeted 
tax expenditure is meant as an incentive 
for an objective considered politically 
significant, the incentive is reduced to the 
degree that the tax burden is avoided or 
shifted. An example of this is subsidies 
paid to enterprises to increase their in-
vestment in poor regions. 
Another aspect of the tax burden, 
which is intensively discussed in public 
finance literature, is the notion of excess 
burden [12, p. 277–296]. This means, that 
in addition to the burden of paying the 
tax, there exists the burden of having to 
adjust to the tax burden one way or the 
other, resulting in a loss of efficiency. Is-
suing a tax expenditure produces such an 
excess burden because it causes the tax-
payer to deviate from his previous prefer-
ences. However, the existence of a tax ex-
penditure might at the same time alleviate 
this problem to a degree because there is a 
lower tax burden to adjust to. 
In addition, it is helpful in this discus-
sion to distinguish between tax expendi-
ture by a lower tax rate versus tax expen-
diture as a reduced tax base. There is a 
notion in optimal taxation [14, p. 527–528] 
that the same tax revenue raised by a high 
tax rate on a small tax base induces more 
excess burden than if the same tax reve-
nue stems from a low tax rate on a broad 
tax base. So far, the difference between 
the effects is not clear enough because 
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“the same revenue” implies that a higher 
tax rate necessarily goes together with a 
smaller tax base and that a broader tax 
base is accompanied by a lower tax rate. 
Now let us move from “the same rev-
enue” to the politically more important 
case of designing a tax expenditure for a 
group of beneficiaries without consider-
ing tax revenue. Then the question arises 
whether a lower rate or a wider base is 
more efficient. To put it differently: What 
influences efficiency more: a variation in 
tax rate or a variation in tax base? This 
question is also a subject in the discussion 
on tax reform alternatives which, from a 
different angle, seem to support this no-
tion: “Tax rate cut cum base broadening” 
[15]. At the same time this notion is proba-
bly behind the attitude of investors to look 
at tax rates first when comparing the tax 
systems of several countries. Therefore, 
whatever the outcome of this discussion, 
it is likely to be significant for the analy-
sis of tax expenditure. The comparison of 
tax expenditure in the form of a lower tax 
rate versus a narrower tax base inevitably 
leads to the question as to which of the two 
instruments have less negative effects. 
2.3. Why is tax expenditure chosen  
as instrument?
Already early in the discussion on tax 
expenditures, their negative aspects fea-
tured strongly, implying that they should 
be thoroughly assessed and reduced as 
far as possible [16; 17, etc.]. However, giv-
en their continuing existence, it becomes 
salient to ask what kind of advantages 
tax expenditures have compared to direct 
expenditure as an instrument of policy? 
An obvious answer here is that in case of 
tax expenditures the administration cost 
involves the simple application of a tax 
rule, whereas direct expenditure requires 
to be administratively channeled to each 
recipient.
However, the question concerning 
why a certain instrument is chosen also 
leads to the field of political economy 
or public choice theory. This approach 
includes the interests of the acting per-
sons and the influence of the institutional 
setting, including voting procedures 
etc.2 Starting with direct expenditure, it 
can apparently be shown to be targeted 
much better than tax expenditure. Money 
handed out by government usually fol-
lows strict rules which document the re-
cipient and the amount received, wheth-
er this be a subsidy to enterprise or social 
expenditure aimed at natural persons. 
A politician may choose this instrument 
for instance if he wants to demonstrate to 
his constituency that he provided money 
in a well-documented way to people who 
are then grateful to him, for instance in 
elections.
On the other hand, this direct expen-
diture has considerable disadvantages for 
the politician since the amounts show up 
in precise figures in the budget and un-
derlie the annual budget revision, thus 
becoming the subject of criticism from 
parliament and the media. As a conse-
quence, expenditure amounts are liable 
to be reduced or abolished in each annual 
budget review. Compared to this, a tax ex-
penditure offers considerable advantages. 
The tax expenditure amount is not known 
beforehand and thus cannot be discussed 
precisely at the time of introduction. Ex 
post, the amount is only visible in tax rev-
enue — and there with difficulty. More-
over, the fact that this tax exemption exists 
at all is only documented in the relevant 
tax law. In contradistinction to annual 
budgets, a tax law is in principle “for eter-
nity”, meaning that any revision needs 
discrete political action.
Taken together, these arguments try 
to answer the question of why tax ex-
penditure is in itself a subject of concern. 
Because it can be used to obscure the in-
tentions of politicians to support certain 
groups, it thereby reduces the desirable 
quality of transparency in political pro-
cesses and access of critical research into 
these political actions.
So far, the discussion has been rather 
abstract. Therefore, an example is given, 
which is intended to show how important 
these issues can be when they are the sub-
ject of research into the field of intergov-
ernmental relations. 
2 For an overview see [13, p. 195–214].
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Since unwilling to subsidize directly 
some activity, a federal government can, 
for example, grant equivalent nationwide 
tax exemptions to taxes otherwise paid to 
the regional and local budgets. This may 
be aimed at relieving the federal budget 
of the burden of the expenditure, which 
would otherwise have to be a direct fed-
eral budget expenditure. Additionally, 
tax benefits can be provided by a federal 
government for taxes that are paid to the 
federal budget, but for activities which 
have obvious territorial boundaries (e.g. 
mineral resource extraction, certain rec-
reational activities, port activities etc.). In 
effect, this resembles a grant given to spe-
cific regions. Moreover, similar examples 
can be given at the state level. In this kind 
of situation, tax expenditures are used 
not only as a means of financing, but also 
as an element of intergovernmental rela-
tions, which forms the subject of the fol-
lowing section.
3. Effects of tax expenditure  
in intergovernmental relations3
3.1. Vertical effects from tax expenditure
3.1.1. Criteria to judge these effects
A system of vertical effects, which can 
be induced by tax expenditure in a federal 
system is introduced in the following. If 
they are to be judged, then certain criteria 
are necessary4:
– assignment criterion — functions 
with their respective expenditure and 
revenue sources have been clearly as-
signed to the levels of government;
– purposiveness criterion — each ex-
penditure item is described precisely by 
purpose and recipient;
– free decision criterion — each level 
is free to decide on the purpose and the 
recipients of its own expenditure, no one 
should interfere with this freedom of lev-
els to use their resources;
3 Mostly based on [1].
4 Some of the criteria are well known from 
constitutional documents (freedom), others from 
fiscal federalism literature [18–20] etc. They have 
been adjusted here to be helpful in the special 
discussion of tax expenditure in the intergovern-
mental relations.
– horizontal equity criterion — any 
transfer from a higher to a lower level 
should be distributed according to the 
specified rule (for example evenly across 
the level or unevenly according to a crite-
rion such as taking fiscal need and fiscal 
capacity into account).
It seems that many of the problems 
caused in federal systems by tax expendi-
tures arise from the fact that these criteria 
are applied to tax expenditure in a differ-
ent way in comparison to how they are ap-
plied to direct expenditure.
For direct expenditure, certain rules 
can be assumed. Some of these may seem 
trivial, but are necessary to show the dif-
ference between direct expenditure and 
tax expenditure:
1. The level of the budget, which fi-
nances an expenditure item, is determined 
by the distribution of functions between 
the levels, as was previously explained. 
2. The purpose and the final recipient 
are generally determined in an exhaustive 
manner in the relevant documents.
3. Usually a budget finances expendi-
ture for its own functions. If the expendi-
ture finances a function of a lower level, 
one speaks of a grant; if a higher level is 
financed, one speaks of a contribution. In 
both cases, only the financing level de-
cides, but the receiving level obtains the 
benefit.
4. If a grant is distributed between dif-
ferent budgets of a level, it can either oc-
cur evenly or according to certain criteria.
With regard to tax expenditure, the 
situation is almost the opposite.
1. The assignment criterion is not met, 
because tax expenditure is characterized 
by the amount of revenue that has not 
been received at a particular budgetary 
level. Therefore, the level that finances 
the expenditure is in this case determined 
not by the distribution of functions be-
tween the levels, but by the distribution 
of revenues.
2. Neither the purpose nor the final 
recipient (beneficiary) of a tax expendi-
ture is determined in an exhaustive man-
ner; moreover, even if the purpose could 
somehow be assumed, the problem with 
the beneficiary still exists, because the tax 
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can be shifted, as was shown in Part 1. 
Consequently, the purposiveness criterion 
is also often not met.
3. If tax expenditure constitutes an 
advantage for one level at the expense of 
another, one should additionally refer to 
the existence of a grant. To give an exam-
ple, a federally granted VAT exemption 
for childcare reduces the need for the lo-
cal support of kindergartens. However, in 
this case, nobody speaks of a grant to the 
local budgets, though it works like a grant 
to the local level. Moreover, such a grant 
might even be exercised by a decision of a 
third party so that the free decision criteri-
on is not met. For example, in Russia a tax 
exemption from the regional transport tax 
exists for local passenger transport, which 
is granted by the federal level.
4. If a tax expenditure is interpreted 
as a grant, it should be noted that its 
horizontal distribution between different 
budgets of a level — and thus between 
regions — is not the same as the distri-
bution of an equivalent grant. Here child-
care can again be used as an example. Lo-
cal government can subsidize it for poor 
parents by not asking a fee. For the same 
purpose, the central government could 
exempt childcare fees from VAT. The in-
cidence is different, both in personal and 
regional terms. The VAT exemption can-
not differentiate between rich and poor 
parents, whereas the local government 
can. This is the effect on personal distri-
bution, but it also has implications for re-
gional distribution. On average, rich par-
ents live in rich regions, whereas in poor 
regions parents tend to be poor. Thus, the 
horizontal equity criterion is additionally 
not met.
To exemplify these statements, it 
might be useful to divide all tax expendi-
ture into different types, based on three 
simple questions: 
(1) Which level decides to grant the tax 
expenditure? This question is not new: 
There are many studies which distin-
guish between tax expenditures accord-
ing to the level at which the decision to 
establish the tax exemption took place 
[5; 6 etc.]. However, as a rule, the stud-
ies are limited to the calculation of the tax 
expenditure amount incurred by a deci-
sion of a particular level; consequently, 
they do not look into the problems of in-
tergovernmental relations, which arise in 
connection with this. For the simplicity of 
the following analysis, it will be referred 
to as the deciding level. Nevertheless, we 
shall also specify here that if several lev-
els are involved — for example first the 
federal government provides local au-
thorities with the right to grant a tax ben-
efit and then local authorities decide on 
the tax benefit itself — then the deciding 
level shall be defined as the level taking 
the final decision on the terms of how the 
tax benefit is applied in practice (which, 
in the given example, is the local level). 
The remaining questions are more im-
portant in the context of intergovernmen-
tal relations. 
(2) Which level bears the lost tax money? 
Tax expenditures are still revenues, al-
beit not received. Therefore, it is always 
known which of the levels bears this fis-
cal burden. Moreover, if we consider this 
question in relation to the first one, we 
will obtain some very interesting combi-
nations, where one level decides and the 
other one finances the consequences of 
this decision. Therefore, for the follow-
ing analysis, it will be referred to as the 
financing level.
The third question adds one more di-
mension to this classification. In short it 
says: (3) Which level is obliged to perform the 
financed function within the federation? The 
main idea here is that tax expenditures as 
well as direct expenditures have to have a 
purpose, i.e. a function, and thus require 
to be assigned to one of the levels in accor-
dance with the distribution of functions 
between the levels. It is at the advantage 
of this level that the tax expenditure oc-
curs. Therefore, this level will be referred 
to as the supported level. 
It can be seen that this third question 
adds one more dimension to the analysis. 
Taken together, these questions provide 
the possibility to classify tax expendi-
tures depending on their effects in the 
system of intergovernmental relations, 
which will form the main topic in the dis-
cussion below. 
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3.1.2. Structuring the vertical effects  
of tax expenditure
This section of the paper deals with 
the various effects that a decision at one 
level in a federal system exerts on the other 
levels. To demonstrate the totality of these 
effects, a classification of tax expenditures 
is needed. For every tax exemption, the 
classification shows the three dimensions 
discussed above: the deciding level, the fi-
nancing level and the supported level. 
The whole classification may look like 
a cube having its sides defined by these 
three dimensions. In addition, the various 
levels of government have to be taken into 
account in each of the three dimensions. 
Each side is therefore built up by the levels 
of government, in this case federal, state 
and local (F, S, L).
The result is a cube which contains 
27 blocks or cube cells. Within the cube, 
each cell is defined first of all by the three 
dimensions. In addition, within each di-
mension the cell is defined by one of the 
three levels of the federal system (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Three-dimensional 
classification of tax expenditures  
in intergovernmental relations 
In order not to distract the reader by 
a great number of examples in a layer-by-
layer analysis, a selection is made, based 
on important conclusions of the analysis. 
For sake of simplicity, each combina-
tion is represented in a code where
– the first letter refers to the level that 
decides on the exemption;
– the second letter refers to the financ-
ing level — or, in other words, the level 
bearing the fiscal burden of the tax expen-
diture; 
– the third letter refers to the level is 
supported — or, in other words, taking re-
sponsibility for the financed function5. 
Taken together, each code consists of 
three letters in a DFS-sequence (deciding-
financing-supported). In this sequence, 
F stands for the Federal level, S for the 
State level and L for the Local level. As an 
example, the combination FSS means that 
the exemption is granted (1) by the deci-
sion of the federal level, (2) at the expense 
of the state budget and (3) in fulfilment 
of a state function. Similarly, SSL means 
that the state decided the exemption at 
the expense of the state budget to address 
local issues.
The analysis of the whole set of com-
binations permits to single out intergov-
ernmentally-consistent and intergov-
ernmentally-flawed tax expenditures. 
Intergovernmentally-consistent are those 
expenditures that are consistent with the 
criteria mentioned above. Actually, there 
are only two types of them:
1. Tax expenditures, which are almost 
equal to the usual direct expenditures, arising 
in the case where deciding, financing and 
supported levels coincide (FFF, SSS, LLL 
blocks).
The VAT zero tax rate for space-re-
lated activities in Russia is a perfect ex-
ample for an FFF block. According to the 
constitution, all space-related activity is 
assigned to the central government, and 
the VAT goes entirely to the federal bud-
get. Thus, no other level but the federal is 
involved. In this kind of situation, a tax 
expenditure can be considered as a direct 
expenditure without any intergovern-
mental effects.
5 For the sake of simplicity, we do not take 
into account here the situation where the assign-
ment criterion is not met (fully or partially), as it 
is true for example for the so called “shared func-
tions”, which are very important in Russia. If tax 
benefits are aimed at such a shared function, the 
issue is much more complicated and will be the 
subject of a separate later study. Likewise, the sit-
uation in which the purposiveness criterion is not 
met and a tax expenditure has no relation to the 
functions of any of the levels, is also not touched 
here and will be the subject of a future study.
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A similar example can be given for the 
state level: in the territory of the Irkutsk 
region (Russia), disabled people are pro-
vided with tax exemption for the trans-
port tax. According to Russian legislation, 
social support and social services for dis-
abled people are assigned to the state (re-
gion). Therefore, taking into account the 
fact that the transport tax goes entirely to 
the state budget, such an exemption does 
not create negative effects in intergov-
ernmental relations, because those who 
decide to issue the tax expenditure, who 
have to bear the burden and whose func-
tion is fulfilled, all coincide in one level. 
2. Also consistent with the criteria are 
tax expenditures that are almost equal 
to a contribution, i.e. cases where decid-
ing and financing levels coincide, while 
the supported level is higher (SSF, LLF, 
LLS blocks). Consequently, in Figure 3 all 
arrows are — in the end — pointing up-
wards. 
Deciding Financing
F
S
L
F
S
L
F
S
L
Figure 3. Tax expenditures equal  
to a contribution
In terms of an example for an SSF 
block, exemption from the corporate 
property tax (which is a state revenue) 
for airports of federal importance may be 
considered. In this case the state decides 
and pays, while the federation is support-
ed. However, since the state has decided 
to grant this exemption independently, it 
follows all the criteria and there is no real 
need to address these kinds of situations. 
Intergovernmentally-flawed tax ex-
penditures, on the contrary, being incon-
sistent with criteria mentioned above, 
introduce flaws in intergovernmental re-
lations. They include at least 4 types:
1. One type of tax expenditures is al-
most equal to a matching grant, arising in 
cases where deciding and financing levels 
coincide, while the supported level is low-
er than the financing level (FFS, FFL, SSL 
blocks, Figure 4). Here all arrows — in the 
end — point downwards. 
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Figure 4. Tax expenditures equal  
to a matching grant
In these cases, functions of the state 
(FFS) or local authorities (FFL, SSL) are fi-
nanced from the higher budget. For exam-
ple, in Russia, charities are exempted from 
VAT, while support for socially-oriented 
non-profit organizations and charity are 
functions of the state. Likewise, childcare 
services are also exempted from VAT; these 
are the responsibility of local authorities. 
In such cases, one can speak of a financial 
support provided to the citizens of a local 
community. This is in effect the same as a 
matching grant. However, a grant is always 
distributed among the beneficiaries accord-
ing to specific criteria derived from person-
al characteristics, while tax expenditures 
generated by VAT are given to all respec-
tive consumers without taking into account 
their need or any other criteria. In this case, 
then, the problem in intergovernmental re-
lations induced by tax expenditures is quite 
obvious because the result of the distribu-
tion depends on the financing channel: tax 
expenditure versus direct expenditure. 
Consequently, tax expenditures lead to a 
violation of the horizontal equity criterion.
2. A second type of tax expenditure is 
almost equal to general expenditure under 
the decision of the higher level. These arise 
in cases where the deciding level is higher 
than the financing level, while financing 
and supported levels coincide (FSS, FLL, 
SLL blocks, Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Tax expenditures, equal  
to general expenditure under  
the decision of the higher level
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In FSS, the central government de-
cides, but the financing is provided for a 
state function from the state budget. An ex-
ample is the federal exemption for agricul-
tural machinery within the transport tax. 
The support of agricultural producers in 
Russia is assigned to the states; if the state 
had a choice, it could decide either to give 
a direct expenditure to some farmers or to 
give a tax exemption. However, this deci-
sion was instead made by the federal gov-
ernment. Exactly the same situation arises 
when the federation grants a tax relief to 
support the local function at the expense 
of the local level (FLL). An example is the 
federal exemption from the payment of 
land tax for organizations of native arts and 
crafts, whose support is the task of the local 
authorities. One more block (SLL) can be il-
lustrated by the tax exemption of childcare 
services from the Russian small enterprise 
tax (“patent tax”). The tax is a revenue of 
local budgets, but the exemption is made 
according to a decision of the state.
Potentially, this kind of situation 
may be observed with regard to direct 
expenditures as well; for example, when 
the federal government establishes some 
rules and standards that require a cer-
tain level of spending on some subna-
tional function. Both, tax expenditures 
and standards reduce local expenditure 
possibilities and divert local expenditure 
from local preferences. Nevertheless, 
state authorities have a choice either to 
spend money or not, while in the case of 
tax expenditure they do not have such a 
choice. Consequently, the free decision 
criterion is not met here. 
3. Tax expenditures that are almost 
equal to an unfunded mandate arise in cases 
where the deciding level is higher than the 
financing level, while the financing level is 
lower than the supported level (FSF, FLF, 
FLS, SLF, SLS, Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Tax expenditures equal  
to an unfunded mandate
This kind of problem can arise, for 
example, when the federation decides to 
issue a tax exemption in its own favor, 
but at the expense of the state (FSF). An 
example is the exemption for military 
transport from the transport tax in Russia, 
while defense is assigned to the federation 
and the transport tax is a revenue received 
at the level of states. A similar situation 
can be observed if the tax exemption is 
given in favor of the local budgets (FSL). It 
happens in Russia, for example, with the 
exemption from the transport tax of lo-
cal passenger transport. In each case, the 
federal decision generates a so-called un-
funded federal mandate — a lower budget 
obligation to spend money on the higher 
levels function which is not provided with 
financing. It is obvious that this constitutes 
a violation of the free decision criterion.
Other examples include land tax ex-
emptions6 — for the organization of the 
penitentiary system (FLF), which is a 
federal function — as well as for the non-
profit organizations of disabled people 
(FLS), which is a state responsibility. 
An unfunded mandate is somewhat 
similar to a contribution: both require that 
the receiving level be higher than the fi-
nancing. But in case of the contribution, 
the deciding level and financing level 
coincide, while in the situation of the un-
funded mandate the deciding level is al-
ways higher than the financing level.
4. Tax exemptions which are almost 
equal to a requested matching grant7, arise 
in cases where the deciding level is lower 
than the financing level, while the financ-
ing level is higher than the supported one 
(SFS, SFL, LFS, LFL, LSL, Figure 7).
These situations are quite unusual, be-
cause they contain an obvious discrepan-
cy. The decision in these cases is made by 
the lower level, while the financing is pro-
vided by the higher level. As a rule, this is 
possible only if the higher level has pro-
vided such an opportunity in the legisla-
tion. An example from the practice of Rus-
6 The land tax is in other countries a part of 
the property tax, together with the taxation of 
buildings.
7 Requested is a type of grant which is only 
given after a formal application has been filed.
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sian fiscal federalism may be the situation 
where, according to a decision taken by a 
state, a special economic zone is created. 
The special tax regime for such zones pre-
supposes a lot of tax exemptions, which 
also incur a burden from tax expenditures 
for the federal budget [21]. In other words, 
in this particular case it is a grant from the 
federal budget given at the request of the 
state. As such, it has the same flaws as a 
usual grant does — the incidence of such 
grants may be different from the incidence 
of direct expenditures for the same pur-
pose. Consequently, the horizontal equity 
criterion is again not met.
There are some other examples; how-
ever, limitations as to the scope of this 
paper do not permit to them all be de-
scribed. For the same reason, an empiri-
cal analysis of each of the described types 
of intergovernmentally-inconsistent tax 
expenditure will be the subject of a fur-
ther study [1]. In this paper, the sole pur-
pose was to study merely in principle the 
impact of such tax expenditures within 
the system of intergovernmental rela-
tions. This constitutes a very important 
means for identifying ways of solving 
the problems that arise in this context. 
The solution can either work through a 
change of the existing tax rules (to make 
tax expenditures compliant with criteria 
mentioned above) or through the use of 
the intergovernmental transfer system. 
In particular, tax expenditures similar 
to unfunded mandates may be addressed 
by adjustments within the system of in-
tergovernmental transfers because in this 
case adequate compensation is required 
from the other level. A separate question 
is which level of government should com-
pensate: the one that decided to introduce 
a tax exemption or the one whose func-
tion was fulfilled this way. Likewise, tax 
expenditures similar to matching grants 
(including requested ones) may also be 
addressed by adjustments within the in-
tergovernmental transfer system if the 
distribution of such “subsidies” does not 
meet the horizontal equity criterion.
Now we turn to the case where a tax 
expenditure is equal to a general expendi-
ture, but the decision to grant it is made by 
the higher level. The example was the fed-
eral exemption for agricultural machinery 
within the transport tax. These cases can-
not be addressed by adjustments inside 
the intergovernmental transfer system but 
have to be carefully studied in order to 
identify the scale of the problem and find 
possible solutions by changing the exist-
ing tax rules. 
At the end of this section discussing 
vertical effects, an additional issue is ad-
dressed. There is a term which is widely 
used for vertical situations in which fis-
cal decisions made by the government at 
one level affect not only its own budget, 
but also that of the government at another 
level. This term is vertical fiscal externali-
ties [22; 23]. A typical case is an increase in 
the income tax of states and local govern-
ments in the USA, which make use of the 
common pool of the income tax base in the 
country. They thereby limit the possibility 
of the central government to do the same, 
because this would result in a too-heavy 
financial burden to the taxpayer, and the 
central government feels responsible for 
this. This effect is unintended by the sub-
national action. The inter-level effects of 
various types of tax expenditures, which 
have been described above, can to some 
degree be called vertical externalities, 
but only insofar as those who decided on 
these tax expenditures probably did not 
intend these effects to occur. Usually, issu-
ing a tax expenditure at the expense of an-
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Figure 7. Tax expenditures, equal to a requested matching grant
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other level of government is a deliberate 
action. Therefore, these are rather genuine 
effects of tax expenditures, which arise in 
the presence of several levels of govern-
ment, and should consequently be treated 
as effects, not as side-effects, as the term 
“externality” would indicate.
3.2. Horizontal externalities  
from tax expenditure
Horizontal fiscal externalities from 
both tax and expenditure occur when the 
independent policies of governments at 
a given level have effects on residents or 
governments of neighboring jurisdictions 
on the same level [19, p. 38]. As to the 
horizontal effects of taxes as such, these 
have been sufficiently studied in the lit-
erature [24; 25 etc.]; to some degree, tax 
expenditures have also been touched on 
there. For example, in relation to the tax 
externalities it has long been accepted that 
tax incentives provided by local authori-
ties increase tax competition between ter-
ritories and thus indirectly influence the 
tax revenues of neighboring territories. 
Another horizontal effect on the tax side 
is tax exporting: by providing a relatively 
favorable tax regime for activities with a 
mainly local area of consumption and, at 
the same time, imposing taxes mostly on 
activities consumed by residents of other 
regions (e.g. hotels, touristic activities, 
goods exported outside the region etc.), 
it is possible to shift the tax burden to the 
residents of neighboring jurisdictions. 
Turning to the expenditure side and its 
externalities (Figure 8), the expenditure ex-
ternalities of what is called here “direct ex-
penditures” have also been dealt with in the 
literature for a long time. But if it comes to 
the “expenditure externalities of tax expen-
diture” (see right side of Figure 8), they are 
still neglected. For instance, expenditure 
spillovers are usually considered as a ben-
efit (or harm) generated by the expenditure 
policy of one jurisdiction to the residents 
of neighboring jurisdictions. So far, these 
spillovers have been researched in respect 
to direct expenditures only. However, ex-
penditure spillovers could be observed in 
respect to tax expenditures as well: their 
existence in this case may be explained not 
only because locally provided goods can be 
used by residents of other regions, but also 
because almost anyone could become the 
beneficiary of that expenditure through tax 
shifting. In other words, due to the absence 
of an obvious recipient of the tax expendi-
tures, the number of channels for spillovers 
multiplies. 
To show these effects, we shall single 
out two types of tax expenditures (de-
pending on the scale of the benefits and 
their beneficiaries [26]), namely:
– narrowly targeted and 
– more universal tax expenditures.
Narrowly-targeted tax expenditures have 
a very specific beneficiary. This can be:
– the taxpayer himself (e.g. tax exemp-
tions from direct taxes);
– the consumer, who buys the tax-
payer’s goods (e.g. VAT exemptions with 
respect to goods with elastic demand);
– the person who supplies the tax-
payer with resources (e.g. decreasing co-
Horizontal externalities in fiscal relations
Tax externalities Tax expenditure externalities
Expenditure 
externalities
Expenditure 
competition
Expenditure 
spillovers
Tax competition
Tax exporting
Figure 8. Horizontal externalities of tax expenditures
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efficients to the tax rate, applied in case of 
employment of disabled people);
– in different proportions both the 
taxpayer and the consumer, as well as the 
person supplying the taxpayer with re-
sources (e.g. VAT exemptions for goods 
with inelastic demand).
If the local authorities have definite 
knowledge as to the ultimate beneficiaries 
of their tax expenditures, it not only gives 
them the ability to make informed and effi-
cient decisions in the field of local tax poli-
cy, but also helps them to identify cases and 
directions of tax expenditure spillovers.
For more universal tax expenditures, one 
cannot specify the beneficiary. If they were 
truly universal, society as a whole would 
benefit as a result of the positive externali-
ties from such activity; however, this would 
seem to be an unlikely objective for a local 
tax expenditure. Consequently, the occur-
rence of spillovers is highly dependent on 
the nature of the activity to be funded. If, 
for example, an exemption from the land 
tax is granted for sports facilities or private 
schools, then the target area is coherent with 
the local consumption area and does not 
generate more risks of spillovers than simi-
lar direct expenditures would. Conversely, 
if the exemption provides benefits for an 
activity with a wider area of consumption 
and thus is more universal, for example an 
exemption from the land tax for land used 
for special environmental purposes, the ex-
emption from the transport tax for electric 
cars, or the exemption from the property 
tax for solar-powered houses or research 
institutes, then they potentially lead to ob-
vious expenditure spillovers, which might 
give reason to act somehow on the national 
or subnational level.
Expenditure competition as another 
expenditure externality is also quite pos-
sible to observe in the case of tax expen-
ditures (Figure 8 above). For example, tax 
exemptions may be aimed at the intensive 
development of specific infrastructure (e.g. 
tax benefits for energy or development 
companies). These, in turn, can attract a tax 
base to the region (for example housing), 
thereby importing it from other regions.
Thus, both tax- and expenditure-
related externalities are to be studied in 
relation to tax expenditures in order to de-
velop the principles that should be used 
for formulating tax exemptions for state 
revenue or local revenue taxes. This is of 
particular importance if we take into ac-
count as a possible outcome of this work 
new approaches to internalize these exter-
nalities by making a decision at the federal 
level, or to minimize their negative impact 
in other ways by some kind of collective 
local decisions on the subnational level.
Here, however, a note of caution is 
necessary, which applies to any external-
ity. The mere existence of an externality is 
in itself not a reason to react to it. This was 
shown in the discussion of environmental 
externalities [27]. To look at externalities 
in terms of their effect and importance 
should therefore precede any political 
advice for action. One should always con-
sider the option of not intervening. For 
that, it is helpful to thoroughly assess the 
consequences of just letting the external-
ity happen and then confront the outcome 
with the cost of intervention. 
3.3. Tax expenditure as equalization 
disturbing element
This final part of the paper does not 
relate to all tax expenditures, but rather to 
a certain type of them — those addressing 
distributional goals. The problem of tax 
expenditure in intergovernmental rela-
tions that can be observed here occurs as 
a result of the discrepancy between two 
equalization channels, which exist in any 
federation.
As to the first channel: since taxes are 
regarded as an important tool of redistri-
bution in a society (beside social expendi-
ture), quite a few tax exemptions in every 
federal state are targeted at supporting 
the poor. In this sense they aim at what is 
called here vertical equalization: reduc-
ing the nationwide gap between rich and 
poor, as expressed by the difference in 
their net income. 
At the same time, there is a second 
channel of equalization, which is usually 
exercised in a federal state through the 
system of equalizing grants, here referred 
to as horizontal equalization. The ulti-
mate objective of this system is dependent 
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on the methodology used for the grant 
distribution. Typically, it is “fiscal capac-
ity equalization” (FCE) or “horizontal eq-
uity equalization” (HEE)8. What is impor-
tant here is that the equalization exercised 
through the intergovernmental transfer 
system is aimed not only at interperson-
al equalization, but also (and in the first 
place) at interregional equalization. 
In general, both channels of equaliza-
tion do not impede each other but rather 
work together to achieve the common ob-
jective in both dimensions — horizontal 
and vertical. This working together can 
be observed when the intergovernmental 
transfer system is based on the FCE meth-
odology and in a situation, in which the 
rich and the poor are almost evenly dis-
tributed between regions so that all re-
gions are quite close to each other in their 
level of average income (which is the case 
in Germany for instance). In this situation, 
both equalizing channels will reduce the 
gap in both dimensions, i.e. between re-
gions and between people. 
However, in a number of cases these 
channels of equalization can work in an 
uncoordinated manner or even in op-
posite direction — this will form a major 
topic in a later study. 
Lack of coordination may be observed, 
for example, if two elements come to-
gether: (1) the intergovernmental transfer 
system is based on the HEE methodology; 
and (2) regions are internally more or less 
income-homogeneous but strikingly dif-
ferent across the country as a whole. In 
this situation, where truly rich and poor 
regions exist side by side, tax expenditures 
aimed at vertical equalization will be ef-
fectively working as transfers from the rich 
regions to the poor, while equalizing grants 
will be just redistributing the revenue be-
tween regions with the same fiscal capacity 
in accordance with their fiscal need. To put 
it differently, the equalization exercised 
through the tax expenditures will be aimed 
only at interpersonal equalization, not tak-
ing into account the difference in the fis-
cal need between the regions. At the same 
time, the intergovernmental transfer sys-
8 For an overview see [28].
tem will be aimed only at the interregional 
equalization, leaving out the gap between 
rich and poor people in the federation. 
This situation might look like a mere 
utopian ideal, almost impossible in prac-
tice (both because HEE methodology is 
almost not used in the world and because 
the difference between regions within 
any country is usually not that large [29]). 
However, it exemplifies very well the dif-
ference between the directions of equaliza-
tion, exercised through different channels. 
In practice and irrespective of whether 
FCE or HEE methodology is applied, situa-
tions are frequently observed where redis-
tributive tax expenditures and equalizing 
grants work in the opposite direction, even 
though this may sound paradoxical. The 
general reason for this is the low degree of 
tax expenditure efficiency when it comes 
to distributive objectives. A more precise 
reason is the dependence of the amount of 
tax expenditure received in a region on the 
purchasing power of the population in the 
region. The most convincing example are 
VAT exemptions: previous studies in Rus-
sia [30] showed that VAT exemptions for 
education and healthcare, which in theory 
were designed to address equity9 issues [31, 
p. 47; 32, p. 21; 33, p. 14–15; 34, p. 36 etc.; 35, 
p. 35; 36, p. 13], have the opposite effect in 
practice. Tax expenditure per capita in a re-
gion caused by this kind of tax exemption 
has a strong positive correlation with the 
average income level in a region. In other 
words, instead of narrowing disparities, 
these tax expenditures mostly accrue in 
rich regions, making disparities wider.
The mechanism of this effect is quite 
obvious, as the following example shows. 
When the same reduced tax rate is ap-
plied for bread (for instance 7 % instead of 
19 % in Germany), no matter whether it is 
cheap or expensive, then the advantages 
of tax expenditures received by the popu-
lation in rich regions (where people buy 
expensive bread) will be considerable, 
whereas in poor regions (where people 
buy the cheap variant) they are smaller. 
9 Under the concept of equity it would be 
helpful to help the poorest, because this would 
bring them close to the average poor. At the same 
time inequality in relation to the rich is reduced.
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At the same time, the regional distribution 
of equalizing grants will work the oppo-
site way. Consequently, when tax expen-
ditures with a strongly marked distribu-
tional objective are distributed across the 
regions without taking into account either 
fiscal need or fiscal capacity, as is typically 
the case, then disparities arise. 
Therefore, some issues have to be ad-
dressed in respect to this kind of equaliza-
tion-oriented tax expenditure. Should one 
target the tax expenditure distribution 
the same way as it is done with respect 
to the equalizing grants? If not, how ex-
actly should they be distributed? If their 
distribution is far from ideal, should the 
government correct this effect within the 
intergovernmental transfer system?
In any case it should be noted here 
that as a result of the use of tax exemptions 
(like those which were given above for the 
VAT), the inter-territorial differences are 
obviously exacerbated. Huge sums of tax 
expenditure are changing the situation of 
people in different regions in favor of re-
gions with high average income, thereby 
undermining fiscal equity. These effects 
therefore require additional study, assess-
ment and adjustment, either at the level 
of tax legislation or within the system of 
intergovernmental transfers.
4. Concluding remark
This paper contributes to the new 
field of tax expenditure as a problem in in-
tergovernmental relations. The problem is 
huge due to the fact that tax expenditures 
account for large amounts in many coun-
tries. Moreover, the problem is caused 
by very particular effects caused by tax 
expenditure and experienced in the area 
of intergovernmental relations. For any 
empirical study in a country, an analyti-
cal framework is needed, which has so far 
been lacking. The framework developed 
here is intended to clarify which kinds of 
effects may occur. There are many of these: 
some are of a horizontal type, while others 
work vertically between the levels of gov-
ernment. Taken together, they should lead 
in any given country to specific measures 
to reduce the observed problems.
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